As this special issue of Intelligence and National Security on 'Developing Intelligence Theory' is published, it is a decade since its three editors decided to put together an initial volume presenting the current state of conceptual thinking about intelligence. That book, Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, 1 was an early output of what developed as a project designed to take forward and be explicit about the importance of theory in developing the study of intelligence. It progressed principally through panels convened at the annual meetings of the International Studies Association, going all the way back to the 2004 meeting in Montreal.
developed theory or set of theories does not exist' . Marrin reports increased awareness of intelligence theory over the past decade, but also that there have been 'only a handful' of efforts to develop new intelligence theory since 2005. On a more positive note, he also sees evidence of intelligence theory being developed outside the Intelligence Studies literature. Given that theories of intelligence are based on those developed in the context of more established academic disciplines, this constitutes an important reminder about the importance of crossdisciplinary awareness and reach on the part of those seeking to work in the area of intelligence theory. As with all inter-or multidisciplinary projects, intelligence scholars need to constantly scan the horizons of the key journals from contributing disciplines in addition to their own subject-specific journals.
One question that arises is whether in developing theoretical thinking about intelligence we are looking for a 'general' theory of intelligence or a 'family' of theories, as Gunilla Ericksson suggests. Arriving at a single theory of intelligence is not a practical aim, as John Fox, Stephen Marrin and Aaron Brantly clearly suggest, although in our work we are guided by Adda Bozeman's attempt to make 'thoughtful generalisations' about the way intelligence works in both Western and non-Western societies.
3 Conscious as we all are that Intelligence Studies is still dominated by work on the Anglosphere, Jeffrey Rogg also cites Bozeman on the need to study as many domains as possible to identify what is common. In his contribution, Rogg reassesses the role of comparative intelligence in testing or constructing a theory of intelligence and offers comparative observations for thinking about a theory of intelligence in an era of transition: ' … comparative intelligence should not only be the semi-permeable testing field for theories of intelligence, but also an active contributor to the process of theory building' .
Given the range of activities that the multiple definitions of 'intelligence' can embrace, our approach should be akin to that of the physicist Stephen Hawking when faced with the reality that it was 'very difficult to devise a theory to describe the universe all in one go' . Instead, Hawking explained, 'we break the problem up into bits and invent a number of partial theories. Each of these partial theories describes and predicts a certain limited class of observations …' 4 A single theory of intelligence may be the seen as a Holy Grail, as a single theory is in science as a means of describing the whole universe, 5 but if it is ever to be attainable it would need to follow and draw on partial theories.
Following on from consideration of the single theory or family of theories question, the next logical step is to consider for whom we are developing theory. Intelligence practitioners tend to be busy people who may have little time to contemplate theory. We proceed on the basis that theoretical reflection has the clear potential to improve performance, and thus Jeffrey Rogg and Gregory Treverton do here consider its utility for practitioners. Beyond practitioners, as with the Intelligence Theory volume, we are clearly also addressing policy-makers and general publics. 6 Peter Gill argues our aim is to describe and explain, warts and all, therefore we must be critical. Hamilton Bean challenges the ' … post-positivist, problem-solving orientation' that dominates Intelligence Studies and seeks to rescue ' … a small, mostly undifferentiated group of constructivist, critical, and post-structuralist theories' from the margins. In similar vein, Eriksson argues that ' … the theoretical approaches within critical policy analysis and policy network analysis would constitute productive research frameworks for the research engaged in the intelligence policy nexus' . Thus, both Bean and Eriksson note the importance of locating the intelligence process in its social and political context, as does Mark Phythian in his contribution.
Comparative analysis should not be just spatial but also temporal: intelligence has been a presence in almost all societies, ancient and modern. John Fox provides a discussion of the extent to which intelligence featured in the very earliest normative considerations of what constituted the good life: 'By looking back to an institutionally less complicated political picture, we may gather clues about the role that intelligence (as we understand it today) played in the development of politics then and how it has evolved since. This in turn would help ground our consideration of intelligence theory and suggest some of its potential outline without the complications of the modern nation state and its entail … there is value in considering how intelligence appeared to the Socratic thinkers and examples to support these claims' . While neither Plato nor Xenophon have been considered to be as significant for the development of Intelligence Studies as Sun Tzu or Kautilya, Fox shows how an analysis of their writings demonstrates their concern with the performance of intelligence roles that were central to the internal and external security of the Greek city states.
From early democratic orders to the contemporary liberal-democratic state; one question that prompted early contributors to the academic literature on intelligence was that of the impact of intelligence practice on liberal-democratic politics. Harry Howe Ransom was one of these early contributors. He identified what he termed the, 'perhaps unresolvable normative problem of balancing the requirements of American democracy with the presumed need for intelligence agency secrecy' . 7 Mark Phythian returns to this foundational question, situating the problem Ransom identified concerning the relationship between intelligence, the state and the citizen both in the nature of liberalism and the 'problem' of the liberal-democratic state.
The contributions by Gunilla Eriksson, John Fox, Peter Gill and Jeffrey Rogg all make the case that the development of theory must be based around process (which is almost universal) not the institutional/ organisational issues that have consumed much Intelligence Studies research. In the Greek city states, intelligence roles were performed by key individuals, Eriksson notes how the obsession with 'fixing' intelligence can lead to over emphasis on institutional design and Rogg notes Jennifer Sims' argument that describing agencies muddies the waters. Reflecting on the role of theory in light of his experience as a practitioner, Treverton also notes that his primary concern was always with process. He identifies some inadequacies of the cycle model -preferring instead that of 'Activity-Based Intelligence' (ABI). Bean is similarly critical of the intelligence cycle model, specifically because it takes no account of the fact that even the collection of 'raw data' presupposes some 'culturally structured categories of thought and action' that need scrutiny and Stout and Warner similarly counsel caution when deploying the model. In considering the state of play with respect to modelling and explaining intelligence, Gill also discusses recent work on the (in)adequacy of the cycle model and suggests the core variables required to explain the intelligence process.
As noted earlier, one key driver of intelligence transformation has been rapid technological advance. Mark Stout and Michael Warner recognise that a new core function for intelligence emerges from the growth of cyber issues; every day it becomes ever clearer that these are bringing profound change to intelligence work. Aaron Brantly deals with this in greater detail: he considers 'the impact of machine learning and artificial intelligence on the legal, regulatory, policy and technical aspects of intelligence as connected devices far surpass humans and provide novel insights into state, sub-state and human behaviour and derives an adaptive theory of Cyber Intelligence, or CYBINT, that will likely play an increasingly central role within the Intelligence Community in the decade(s) to come' . He goes on to argue that theory is important in order to develop coherent and valid methods for searching large volumes of data whereas, for Treverton, the strength of ABI is that it rests on correlation, not causation. Data are ubiquitous and a central feature of it is that it deprivileges the validation of sources; the 'mashing up' of large data sets may even, occasionally, produce 'answers' to questions we had not thought of. Brantly makes the same point. This has profound implications for intelligence.
Another reason for concentrating on process is the fact that many state and non-state organisations that are not characterised as 'intelligence agencies' actually conduct an intelligence process in order to further organisational objectives. Therefore, theory must encompass the increase in public-private partnerships (Brantly) and non-state actors (Rogg). Corporate intelligence not only provides competition to the product of state agencies but states are largely dependent upon communication service providers (CSPs) for the data upon which they rely.
Historically, a state-centric Intelligence Studies has developed much in tune with International Relations, with Realism the school of IR that has taken root most clearly in Intelligence Studies. Similarly, Realism has been the fundamental, though often unspoken, assumption at the root of much intelligence analysis. Phythian sets out the continuing relevance of this in explaining the tension that the practice of intelligence can generate in liberal-democratic states. At the same time, Hamilton Bean and Gunilla Eriksson argue that other approaches such as discourse analysis should be used to expose the underlying assumptions in intelligence communications. It follows that instead of seeking for an unobtainable goal of 'objectivity' , fairness and clarity should be the goal for analysts. For Treverton 'intelligence is ultimately about telling stories, and most "intelligence -or warning -failures" derive from holding onto stories that events have outmoded' .
Strenuous efforts are made, especially in new democracies, to 'professionalize' intelligence work in order to improve its ability to serve the public interest rather than the interest of whomever happens to be in power at the time. Yet, a theme running through many of these articles is that 'intelligence is politics' . A starting point for John Fox is that the 'practice of intelligence … permeates our political discussion today, occupying a central role in how we understand the powers of the modern state and what we expect in their application' . This insight is also foundational to critical theory. Gunilla Eriksson suggests using critical policy analysis to analyse the distortions in the information process and other articles urge the examination of organisational cultures. The idea of separating 'intelligence' from 'policy' in order to prevent politicisation oversimplifies what is a more nuanced interchange between practitioners and politicians including the roles played by different people during their interactions. Since intelligence seeks to influence decision-makers, the choice of language inevitably 'politicises' the process. Stout and Warner's conclusion that 'intelligence is what the boss says it is …' is particularly interesting given the relationship between US President Donald J. Trump and his major intelligence agencies, strained by the findings of the intelligence community on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential elections published before he had entered the White House. 'These are the same people that said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction' , Trump responded. As former NSA and CIA Director Michael Hayden put it: 'To have the president-elect of the United States simply reject the fact-based narrative that the intelligence community puts together because it conflicts with his a priori assumptions -wow' . 8 As Brantly notes: ' … intelligence analysis is at the dawning of a new era, a digital era in which information collected from everything from toasters and coffeemakers can now be incorporated with human sources' . Taking this along with Treverton's advocacy of ABI indicates the major challenges to intelligence practice -and thus to Intelligence Studies, the place of theory therein, and its central mission of explaining the intelligence process to key academic and public constituencies. In this context, much work remains to be done. Taken together, the articles published in this special issue indicate a range of ways in which thinking conceptually about intelligence has advanced over the last decade, something that Stephen Marrin analyses closely in his contribution. However, Marrin also highlights the limits to this advance since the publication of the Intelligence Theory volume. We concluded our Introduction there with a plea for contributions from Africa, Asia, and elsewhere in Europe and the Americas. Despite some recent advances in comparative analysis that consciously aim to move beyond the Anglosphere, 9 this remains the principal requirement ten years on. For the conceptual study of intelligence to advance significantly will require critical reflections that take us beyond US and Western Europe, and facilitate consideration of whether the arguments developed here do pertain more widely than in just those 'old democracies' . We hope that this collection will act as a prompt for submission of such critical commentaries to this and other journals and that the next time a group of editors seek to produce a volume assessing the state of conceptual thinking about intelligence it will be informed by the broadest possible geographical coverage.
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